Archive for the ‘Uncategorized’ Category

Articles on Internet Vote Fraud

July 17, 2018

Secretaries of State in key markets had a computer patch installed that allowed ‘real-time’ tabulation from disparate voting machines. Why? WHY! Answer: So they could determine where and how many Romney votes needed deletion.

Obama had 9 million less votes than in 2008. Yet, turnout was up both in early voting and at the polls. Why then were Romney’s numbers 3 million LESS than McCain’s back in 2008 when there was NO HOT BUTTON?

Dismiss my theory, but it is pure deduction based on an indelible fact about the tabulation patch. And if true, it means the election process is permanently corrupted . . . over.

Why file fraudulent voter registrations and work to send in bogus absentee ballots when all you have to do is lose, ‘in vivo machina,’ just enough of your opponents votes.

The theory can be tested. The Ohio machines (and similar setups) must be analyzed to see if the tabulations can be altered, i.e., votes deleted.

In lieu of paper ballots, we need two counts: One at the door taken mechanically by two poll workers, and the other from the machine tabulation tallies. They must match up within a margin of error.

http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9233316/Judge_throws_out_Ohio_lawsuit_over_software_on_vote_tabulation_machines

For a detailed record of the Complaint and Expert Opinion Affidavit describing the ‘patch’ by a computer engineer, see http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/Fitrakis.v.Husted.1.php

See also http://spectator.org/archives/2010/11/02/soros-vote-counters
Up-date Jan 8, 2013 — There was the story of the disgraced Ohio Dem politician, bragging about teaching people how to defraud the vote through gas bills and fake ID. Here is the latest — http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/340174/voter-fraud-never-happens-keeps-coming-back-john-fund
Jerome Corsi’s upcoming book will describe vote fraud in the 2012 election. My theory, and ‘napkin/post-it’ calculations showed that by picking key districts, powerful poll officials, especially in Ohio (where Obama’s 2008 election organization never shut its doors) could have undermined the Romney vote and vote count, changing the election.
Up-date Nov 27: Two articles that are a must read. http://www.wnd.com/2012/11/fbi-asked-to-probe-obama-vote-changing-machines/ and http://www.wnd.com/2012/11/the-big-list-of-vote-fraud-reports/

* * * http://www.wnd.com/2012/12/how-to-stop-an-ineligible-president/ * * *

Up-date Nov 16, 2012: Salon.com Nov. 5, 2012. http://www.salon.com/2012/11/05/ohio_republicans_sneak_risky_software_onto_voting_machines/

Must SEE! http://conservativevideos.com/2012/11/programmer-under-oath-admits-computers-rig-elections/

This article concludes that even ‘de minimus’ (minute) changes to the tabulation software can affect the entire system. Who benefitted? Was it used to control the outcome of the critical Ohio vote? See the Boxer/Tubb Jones Title 3 Sec 15 challenge to the 2000 Ohio tabulation at the end of Section II.

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Justice Horace Gray–Judge? Or Legislator

February 16, 2018

Author’s Note:  It is difficult to condense the error of Justice Horace Gray onto one page. Gray took great liberties with the Osborne case and English common law in order to create a new ‘citizenship at birth.’

HORACE GRAY IN WONG KIM ARK – JUDGE? OR LEGISLATOR

Following is an examination of one Supreme Court precedent cited in the Wong Kim Ark case, which Justice Gray proceeds to ignore. The colored text matches commentary with the actual text from Wong Kim Ark.

Justice Gray decided to expand the principle of ‘jus soli’ to give Ark citizenship at birth, although that citizenship was barred by statute and treaty. He did this by paraphrasing the Osborne case and using English common law to conflate ‘native born’ with ‘citizenship at birth,’ while 14th Amendment citizenship for those ‘born in the United States’ was post nati. Natural born citizenship remained, as it had since 1790, dependent first on U.S. citizen parents, not place of birth.

Here is Gray discussing ‘citizenship at birth’ deciding while ‘born in the United States’ as defined in the 1866 Civil Rights Act and 14th Amendment ‘citizenship clauses’ were constitutional, the constitution “conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect of birth.” Gray relies on Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 827 to conflate ‘native’ birth with citizenship, which was nowhere in statute;

[N]o act or omission of Congress, as to providing for the naturalization of parents or children of a particular race, can affect citizenship acquired as a birthright, by virtue of the Constitution itself, without any aid of legislation. The Fourteenth Amendment, while it leaves the power where it was before, in Congress, to regulate naturalization, has conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship. Wong Kim Ark, (p704)

But, Gray is paraphrasing Osborn, assuming ‘native-born’ as synonymous with ‘natural born citizen.’ This is a leap, relying solely on selected English common law as precedent. So, Justice Gray was fabricating a gap in the law for the judiciary to enter in creating ‘citizenship at birth’ for children born of all aliens, not just the freed slaves of African descent. He justified this, subtly criticizing the exclusion of naturalization to ‘non-whites,’ invoking 1870 statute extending naturalization to those of African descent but still denying naturalization of Chinese.[1]

The power, granted to Congress by the Constitution, “to establish an uniform rule of naturalization” was long ago adjudged by this court to be vested exclusively in Congress. Chirac v. Chirac (1817), 2 Wheat. 259. For many years after the establishment of the original Constitution, and until two years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress never authorized the naturalization of any but “free white persons.” Acts of March 26, 1790, c. 3, and January 29, 1795, c. 20; 1 Stat. 103, 414; April 14, 1802, c. 28, and March 26, 1804, c. 47; 2 Stat. 153, 292; March 22, 1816, c. 32; 3 Stat. 258; May 26, 1824, c. 186, and May 24, 1828, c. 116; 4 Stat. 69, 310.

While Gray relied on English common law as precedent, he cited U.S. law that was contrary to his opinion and ignored it. The 39th Congress in debate and statute, and stare decisis five-years previously in Elk vs. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884), the issue of ‘born or naturalized’ was recognized as settled law, already defined:

It is also worthy of remark that the language used about the same time by the very Congress which framed the Fourteenth Amendment, in the first section of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, declaring who shall be citizens of the United States, is “all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed.”

Gray ignores “and not subject to any foreign power” which had nothing to do with whether the child was a ‘free white,’ or ‘non-white.’ It is essential to mention here that Congress decided that the ‘citizenship clause’ of the 14th Amendment was completely in agreement and sourced from that same clause in the 1866 Civil Rights Act.

Conclusion: Congressional record, statute, and constitutional amendment created a post nati ‘jus soli’ citizenship at birth because the standard of jus sanguinis was impossible for children of freed slaves. However, ALL OTHER CHILDREN HAD PARENTS OF ‘FOREIGN ALLEGIANCE.’ So, in order to grant Wong Kim Ark citizenship, Horace Gray acted not as a judge applying law and stare decisis, but as a rogue legislator from the bench.

[1] By the treaty between the United States and China, made July 28, 1868, and promulgated February 5, 1870, it was provided that nothing herein contained shall be held to confer naturalization upon citizens of the United States in China, nor upon the subjects of China in the United States. 16 Stat. 740. By the act of July 14, 1870, c. 254, § 7, for the first time, the naturalization laws were “extended to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.” 16 Stat. 256. This extension, as embodied in the Revised Statutes, took the form of providing that those laws should “apply to aliens [being free white persons, and to aliens] of African nativity and to persons of African descent;” and it was amended by the act of February[p702] 18, 1875, c. 80, by inserting the words above printed in brackets. Rev.Stat. (2d ed.) § 2169; 18 Stat. 318. Those statutes were held, by the Circuit Court of the United States in California, not to embrace Chinese aliens. In re Ah Yup (1878), 5 Sawyer 155. And by the act of May 6, 1882, c. 126, § 14, it was expressly enacted that “hereafter no state court or court of the United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship.” 22 Stat. 61. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893), above cited, this court said: Chinese persons not born in this country have never been recognized as citizens of the United States, nor authorized to become such under the naturalization laws. Wong Kim Ark (p704)

 

Copy and Send this to Your Congressmen

February 14, 2018

Citizenship at Birth, or Organized Invasion

citing blackstone

A Few Words About ‘Citizenship at Birth’

The feudal concept of allegiance to a Lord or King by birthplace is from medieval times when wealth was solely in the hands of royalty and the church. The peasant class, or ‘villeins;’ owed complete subjection to the landowner in exchange for protection.

The U.S. Supreme Court changed citizenship law in 1869 relying on old English law, but England had made statutory departures from the feudal concept of allegiance from ‘place of birth’ as far back as 1351. (25 Edw. 3, stat. 2, et seq.) The legal tenet of natural born subjects by sanguinity, through father and mother, was essential to the English Empire while pursuing foreign commerce and colonialism.

The ‘Law of Nations’ by Vattel, a legal authority on Nationality law, noted that a country could only replenish itself with children of its own citizens (§ 212). Both the British Nationality Act of 1772 and our First Uniform Naturalization Act of 1790 determined citizenship of a child followed that of the father, not place of birth. Under both British and U.S. law, a child born on U.S. soil to a British subject was not a U.S. citizen, but British.

In fact, the only reason the ‘jus soli’ was invoked seventy-six years later in the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the 14th Amendment was because freed slaves had no nationality to confer by blood (sanguinity). As property they were determined to be stateless, non-citizens. Citizenship was granted ‘post nati’ because they were ‘born in the United States’ with no ‘foreign subjection,’ and were allegiant to the Union.

However, thirty-years after the ‘born in the United States’ citizenship clause became part of the Reconstruction Acts and our constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court in Wong Kim Ark (1898) decided to abrogate existing treaty with China (The Burlingame Treaty) and statute (Exclusionary Acts, Cooley Act) in order to create a new naturalization law; citizenship at birth to children of alien parents.

In the Wong Kim Ark case (a Chinese cook in his twenties) the court was catering to the Chinese Six Companies, wealthy from the California Gold Rush and commerce, whose great enterprise required more access to Chinese immigrants, and freer passage to and from China. This was hindered by treaty and statute, so the Chinese Companies sued, using Wong Kim Ark as plaintiff.

Original Intent of Congress

When the 14th Amendment was proposed and the ‘citizenship clause’ debated, one senator’s comment illustrates the confusion, even then, over what was the legal foundation for citizenship at birth:

The ancient and indisputable citizenship rule of the British common law was the jus soli, under which a person’s nationality is determined by the place of his birth…. It is clear, of course, that the American colonies and the nation they ultimately established had accepted the precepts of the English common law, as part of the heritage from the mother country. Cong. Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Sess. 1262 (1866) (Congressman Broomall)

However, Congressman Broomall was wrong. How? First, as discussed above, even British law from 1351 to 1772 recognized the rightful inheritance of ‘leigance’ from the father, regardless of place of birth. Secondly, the American states barred reliance on English ‘common law’ as precedent unless specifically codified. And, thirdly; the U.S. Constitution enumerated (Art. I, Sec. 8 Cl. 4) congress plenary power over Uniform Naturalization, not to be revised or misinterpreted by common law or the judiciary.

There were competing opinions then, as now, but in the end the Senate approved the ‘citizenship clause’ determining that the citizenship clause of the 1866 Civil Rights Act defined it correctly:

In the first section of the proposition of the committee, the word “citizen” is used. That is a term about which there has been a good deal of uncertainty in our Government. The courts have stumbled on the subject, and even here, at this session, that question has been up and it is still regarded by some as doubtful. I regard it as settled by the civil rights bill, and, indeed, in my judgment, it was settled before. . . The Senator from Maine suggests to me, in an undertone, that persons may be born in the United States and yet not be citizens of the United States. Cong Globe 39th Congress (1866) 2768, 2769 Pres. pro tem Senator Wade (OH)

Here is case law, Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884); cited by Wong Kim Ark (1898) but for some reason not followed as precedent:

The main object of the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment was to settle the question, upon which there had been a difference of opinion throughout the country and in this Court, as to the citizenship of free negroes ( 60 U. S. 73; Strauder v. West Virginia,@ 100 U. S. 303, 100 U. S. 306. This section contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. The persons declared to be citizens are “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” The evident meaning of these last words is not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, [emphasis added]  or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired. (p. 111) It is also worthy of remark that the language used about the same time by the very Congress which framed the Fourteenth Amendment, in the first section of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, declaring who shall be citizens of the United States, is “all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed.” 14 Stat. 27; Rev.Stat. § 1992. (p. 103)

I emphasized ‘proceedings’ because Justice Horace Gray used this word as a logical fulcrum point to move the law in a different direction. However, ‘proceedings’ was perhaps a poor choice of words because while naturalization law proceedings definitely applied to adults changing nationality of their own free will, the new nationality of the parent could have the effect of naturalizing their children and wives. The children did not participate in any ‘proceedings,’ but by natural law and statute followed the allegiance of the father. (The Wong Kim Ark court actually created a conflict of law, dual nationality; a conundrum that continues to complicate Nationality law.)

In 1940, a child born to a U.S. citizen mother abroad to a foreign father could acquire U.S. citizenship, but only if the mother returned to the U.S. and the child completed 5-years continuous residency. However, in 1952 the residency requirement was repealed and the child acquired a ‘post nati’ citizenship at birth. Statutory ‘citizenship at birth’ was discretionary, but no Act of Congress or case law was required if the child was born to a U.S. citizen father, a natural born citizen.

Many fail to make this distinction, conflating for convenience ‘natural born’ and ‘at birth.’ They are different, however; one by Natural Law and the other by statute. This distinction exists and yet the courts and congress refuse to address it.

The point is that the statutes required legal naturalization and residency. Until the Wong Kim Ark case, U.S. naturalization law never conferred citizenship automatically to aliens, be they domiciled legally or illegally.

The Reconstruction Acts of 1866 introduced ‘born in the United States’ in the manner of the ‘jus soli’ for only one reason; because freed slaves as property had no citizenship or nationality to confer to their children. Thus, the language of the 1866 Civil Rights Act specified ‘not subject to any foreign power,’ which is what ‘under jurisdiction thereof’ meant as well in the 14th Amendment.

Here is a law school professor who got it right, very clearly stated, and properly citing the Slaughter-House cases and Elk vs Wilkins, John Eastman, Henry Salvatori Professor of Law and Community Service, at Chapman University’s Fowler School of Law:

Subject to the jurisdiction” means more than simply being present in the United States. When the 14th Amendment was being debated in the Senate, Senator Lyman Trumbull, a key figure in its drafting and adoption, stated that “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States meant not “owing allegiance to anybody else. (See in the quote from Sen. Wade where he admits the Civil Rights Act’s ‘without allegiance to any foreign power’ settled the matter of which children born on U.S. soil were not granted citizenship.) New York Times UPDATED December 22, 2015  https://tinyurl.com/ydczevzt
See also http://ashbrook.org/publications/oped-eastman-04-hamdi/

‘Jurisdiction’ is another word abused by the courts. The intent of the lawmakers choosing it was as the converse of ‘not subject to any foreign power.’ Diplomats have almost complete immunity to U.S. law as they are under total jurisdiction of their home country. Native Americans, ‘not taxed,’ had similar sovereignty protections. Travelers and those establishing ‘domicile’ have varying degrees of jurisdiction from both their home country and the United States. They are subject to U.S. criminal code and some tax laws, but they cannot be drafted into military service except by their home country. There is a process required for long term residency and naturalization, and as for any children born in the United States, regardless of any conflicting interpretation of the citizenship clause, the nationality of the parent is still conferred to the child.

Immigrants? Or, Invaders!

A category rarely mentioned, immune to nationality laws, are foreign military forces. My point being, that aliens who enter illegally in order to seek employment, social services, commit crimes, and abuse the misinterpretation of the citizenship clause are no better than invading foreign forces and should be repelled, and not given quarter nor benefits of ‘domicile.’

And ‘invasion’ is not a hyperbole! The illegal immigrant movement is organized both North and South of the border, even helped along by the Mexican government. After all, they are not only infiltrating the United States culturally and politically, but hundreds of billions of dollars come back into their economy every year, and that is not accounting for drug cartels.

A copy of this article should be sent to every congressman, and the president,

Leonard A. Daneman

 

A Picture of Wong Kim Ark

January 18, 2018

Since 2008, I’ve been researching U.S. statute and legislative history on ‘Citizenship at Birth,’ especially as it involves misinterpretation of the 14th Amendment and a judicial ‘revision’ of Article II’s ‘presidential eligibility clause.’ 

Following is the closest I’ve come yet to a clear and simple, irrefutable conclusion:

It is ironic, and underlines how ridiculous birthright citizenship is, that almost every citizenship at birth that relies solely on the Wong Kim Ark misinterpretation of ‘born in the United States . . . subject to the jurisdiction thereof’ are children of illegal aliens. All other citizens at birth inherit U.S. citizenship from one or both parents; if the father by natural sanguinity, or if a U.S. citizen mother by statute removing the father’s nationality.

If someone has to BREAK THE LAW FIRST IN ORDER TO BENEFIT FROM THE LAW, SOMETHING IS TERRIBLY WRONG, and that was Wong Kim Ark.

Here is a law school professor who got it right, very clearly stated, and properly citing the Slaughter-House cases and Elk vs Wilkins:*
John Eastman, Henry Salvatori Professor of Law and Community Service, at Chapman University’s Fowler School of Law:

“Subject to the jurisdiction” means more than simply being present in the United States. When the 14th Amendment was being debated in the Senate, Senator Lyman Trumbull, a key figure in its drafting and adoption, stated that “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States meant not “owing allegiance to anybody else.” (See in the quote from Sen. Wade where he admits the Civil Rights Act’s ‘without allegiance to any foreign power’ settled the matter of which children born on U.S. soil were not granted citizenship.) New York Times UPDATED December 22, 2015 https://tinyurl.com/ydczevzt  (shortened link to New York Times Guest Opinion Page)
See also http://ashbrook.org/publications/oped-eastman-04-hamdi/

However, the Wong Kim Ark majority opinion argued that the exceptions to ‘born in the United States’ citizenship were denied to ONLY three specific groups; and therefore the rest not exempt. That was faulty logic designed to achieve a predetermined outcome to the case. These judges wanted to change 108-years of jus sanguinis (inherited from father) legislated immigration and naturalization law into jus solis ‘place of birth.’

One example the court relied on was Native Americans born on U.S. soil, but allegiant to their sovereign tribal territories were exempt under the 14th Amendment from citizenship. That example, however, is not logical as ‘Native Americans not taxed’ were born to separate sovereignties and therefore not citizens. Even today, Native American lands operate under different laws and, like under the Torts Claims Act, determine if a U.S. citizen has jurisdiction to pursue any action against the tribe or a tribal member.

When the 14th Amendment was proposed and the ‘citizenship clause’ debated, one senator’s comment illustrates the confusion, even then, over what was the legal foundation for citizenship at birth: “The ancient and indisputable citizenship rule of the British common law was the jus soli, under which a person’s nationality is determined by the place of his birth…. It is clear, of course, that the American colonies and the nation they ultimately established had accepted the precepts of the English common law, as part of the heritage from the mother country.” Cong. Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Sess. 1262 (1866) (Congressman Broomall)

Congressman Broomall was wrong. Why? First, even British law from 1351 to 1772 first recognized the rightful inheritance of leigance from the father, regardless of place of birth. This was an essential law during England’s colonial empire. Second, most states barred reliance on English ‘common law’ unless specifically codified. And, third, the U.S. Constitution specified plenary power over Uniform Naturalization law to be the jurisdiction of Congress. Wong Kim Ark cited U.S. naturalization statute from 1790 to 1855, but used its misinterpretation of the 14th Amendment to overturn over a century statute. (In our time, this misinterpretation of ‘citizenship at birth’ was used to ‘amend’ Article II’s ‘eligibility clause,’ allowing the son of a British citizen, a non-immigrant alien, to run for president.)

There were competing opinions, and in the end the Senate approved the ‘citizenship clause’ determining that the ‘citizenship clause’ of the 1866 Civil Rights Act defined it correctly:

Cong Globe 39th Congress 2768, 2769
Pres. pro tem Senator Wade (OH)
“In the first section of the proposition of the committee, the word “citizen” is used. That is a term about which there has been a good deal of uncertainty in our Government. The courts have stumbled on the subject, and even here, at this session, that question has been up and it is still regarded by some as doubtful. I regard it as settled by the civil rights bill, and, indeed, in my judgment, it was settled before. . . The Senator from Maine suggests to me, in an undertone, that persons may be born in the United States and yet not be citizens of the United States.”

* Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)
The main object of the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment was to settle the question, upon which there had been a difference of opinion throughout the country and in this Court, as to the citizenship of free negroes ( 60 U. S. 73; Strauder v. West Virginia,@ 100 U. S. 303, 100 U. S. 306. This section contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. The persons declared to be citizens are “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” The evident meaning of these last words is not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts, or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired. (p. 111) It is also worthy of remark that the language used about the same time by the very Congress which framed the Fourteenth Amendment, in the first section of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, declaring who shall be citizens of the United States, is “all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed.” 14 Stat. 27; Rev.Stat. § 1992. (p. 103)

A Picture of Wong Kim Ark: an article lauding the 1898 Decision

https://www.scpr.org/blogs/multiamerican/2011/01/19/7987/who-was-wong-kim-ark/

Dr. Orly Taitz Vindicated

December 25, 2016

Sheriff Arpaio’s ‘Cold Case Posse’ has released its findings on the April 2011 Birth Certificate posted as a PDF on whitehouse.gov. I had the privilege of being asked by Dr. Jerome Corsi to forward my legal research and Adobe Illustrator file on Obama’s ‘citizenship at birth’ to Detective Michael Zullo, who headed the ‘Cold Case Posse’ investigation.

Today, Dr. Taitz sent an email  notice to her followers and the press that she was ‘Vindicated.’ I agree. http://www.orlytaitzesq.com/watch-live-sheriff-arpaio-obama-birth-certificate-press-conference/

Dr. Orly Taitz Vindicated

Perhaps further investigation will acknowledge the FACT that the whitehouse.gov Birth Certificate was fabricated in Adobe Illustrator in order to kybosh sales and promotion of Dr. Corsi’s book release the following month, ‘Where’s the Birth Certificate.’

In addition, the document and further analysis will show that Barack Hussein Obama was illegitimate, not only at birth but as president; and this will aid in the deconstruction and reversal of his hundreds of Executive Orders.

JUST FOR FUN

Below is a photo with various Obama birth documents followed by multiple choice questions. Your job is to match the photo with the description, and comment whether ‘Real’ or ‘Unreal,’ that determination based on the Evidentiary Value of the Document in a Court of Law.

birth-certificate-long-form-art  A

BO-Birth-Cert1-327x450B

kenyandocument C

COLB D

SeptBirthCertificateLarge E

___  Forged document, fabricated in Adobe Photoshop

___  Facsimile of Hawaii form creating a Birth Certification for a Child Born Out-of-State, signed by Obama’s Hawaiian grandmother

___ Official document, signed and sealed by government official, of Obama birth data from original certificate

___ Database printout of birth data from Hawaii birth registration

___ Photocopy of original birth certificate

 

How a Class E Chauffeur’s License and the Supremacy Clause can Cure UBER’s insurance issues, unfair tax and regulation exemptions, and their monopolistic practices against taxi companies and contract drivers

October 8, 2016

October 4, 2016

A New Mexico Class ‘E’ Chauffeur’s License will Solve Uber Safety Issues

The Transportation Network Services Act is Preempted by the Supremacy Clause

Predatory Pricing and Vertically Integrated Monopoly

Uber Contractors Operating Without Insurance

Synopsis:

The 2016 NM Transportation Network Services Act [TNSA] is only six-months old, but is fatally flawed.

It is in direct conflict with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration [FMCSA] regulations and definitions, and its insurance ‘scheme’ has gaps of non-coverage.

Especially as the Uber app facilitates interstate transportation, it is subject to federal laws the TNSA purports Uber exempt. Therefore, New Mexico’s TNSA is preempted by the Supremacy Clause.

New Mexico’s legislature was pressured into accommodating Uber, however, the Uber phenomenon is not a ‘new’ technology requiring special treatment. Uber did not invent GPS or first associate Smartphone GPS with a tracking app. Uber did, however, use Disruptive Marketing to take over local taxi business, forcing its way in while hiding from regulators in the ‘ether’ of the Internet, openly challenging state enforcement of regulations, business taxes; and while violating antitrust law.

In comparison, nine months prior to Uber, Call-A-Cab® launched a GPS taxi logistics ‘peer-to-peer’ website perfect for Smartphones, but also accessible by PC, tablet, and landlines. And Call-A-Cab did it legally.

The following analysis of the 2016 NM TNSA is not intended to put Uber out of business. Uber is a very popular Smartphone app. However, the State of New Mexico must modernize its Motor Carrier and MVD statutes in order to promote its legitimate interest in public safety, and end Uber’s monopolistic practices of predatory pricing and blocking competition.

The current Uber business model, as described in the TNSA, unfairly exploits its contractors and their vehicles, perpetuates monopolistic practices, and at times leaves drivers and passengers completely uninsured.

On the other hand, if the measures suggested in this analysis are adopted, Uber can continue doing business, its contract drivers will have more opportunities earn a fair income, and taxi companies and their drivers can participate as well.

In 2011, the first 4G LTE Broadband Smartphones were introduced (3G was not fast enough to handle streaming GPS data) and in 2013 Albuquerque taxi driver, Leonard Daneman, launched the Call-A-Cab® GPS Taxi Logistics website. https://taxiabq.com He also designed a GPS tracking website called GPS ON TIME. http://www.gpsontime.com

Uber and Lyft entered the Albuquerque market illegally in 2014 and in 2015 their Predatory Pricing practices decimated local taxi fleets. Call-A-Cab® was in striking distance of competing head-to-head with Uber, but Uber dropped their rates from $2.25 to 85 cents per mile. Call-A-Cab went from thirty subscribed drivers (our target for optimal logistics was fifty) to only four.

Added: November 13, 2016–Desoto Cab Company of San Francisco agrees with my year of complaints against Uber’s Predatory Pricing and on November 2, 2016 filed Desoto vs. Uber in Federal Court. See Desoto Cab Co vs Uber Technologies

While Call-A-Cab’s website redirects about $10,000 in taxi customers to three cab companies, no cab company will adopt Call-A-Cab’s GPS logistics to its dispatch office. Yellow Cab liked Call-A-Cab and eventually computerized its dispatch office, but at that time did not appreciate the value of Call-A-Cab’s peer-to-peer website; which is unfortunate because it would have put Yellow Cab a year ahead of Uber and Lyft.

iconubercac

Smartphone Icon

UBER can be subjected to state and federal Motor Carrier safety regulations simply by adopting the Class E Chauffeur’s License into New Mexico law.

 

IN ADDITION, once Uber is brought into compliance, existing taxi companies and drivers can participate and profit while providing superior services to the public, not just smartphone users.

Uber has fatal flaws. Its insurance scheme at times leaves Uber drivers uninsured. In addition, Call-A-Cab’s GPS website does what Uber can’t: it can distribute calls both through taxi dispatch and directly to drivers from business landlines, accept cash fares, and its interactive GPS Logistics Map can specify types of vehicles and passenger capacity.

The Class E Chauffeur’s License

A good model to follow is the law used by the state of Missouri. They force Uber into the federal definition of ‘for hire,’ require ‘taxi’ license plates, and also control proof of commercial insurance. Some states require periodic vehicle inspections. Commercial vehicle inspections can be monitored by taxi companies who are already organized to facilitate Motor Carrier Act compliance.

Taxi Companies Will Not Just Survive, But Profit

Taxi companies not only lease taxicabs, but micromanage Motor Carrier Act compliance. The state Class E license application would take over the initial driver tests, checks, and inspections; the taxi companies would then take over compliance oversight charging a monthly fee to both Uber and taxi drivers using personal cars for commercial passenger transport.

Uber created the Transportation Network Services Act [TNSA] to avoid taxes and obstruct regulation under federal and state Motor Carrier laws, however, that in itself may be its undoing:         

Question:       Is New Mexico’s 2016 Transportation Network Services Act [TNSA] preempted by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration [FMCSA]?

Answer:          Yes. A state statute must not conflict with, contradict, or obstruct enforcement of federal law. Under public policy and legitimate state interest, commercial interstate transportation of passengers is subject to federal and state safety regulations.

Conclusion:    A New Mexico Class E license would facilitate ‘for hire’ drivers meeting New Mexico Motor Carrier Act, FMCSA safety, and commercial insurance regulations.

Discussion:     Generally speaking, a state statute is preempted by the Supremacy Clause if it violates, contradicts or obstructs enforcement of federal law. Azar vs Prudential Insurance Company, 68 P.3d 909 (2003) 133 N.M. 669 2003-NMCA-062[1]

The New Mexico Motor Carrier Act regulates commercial transportation as public policy; the state having legitimate interest in the safety and welfare of citizens using ‘for hire,’ or commercial cars and taxis. State Motor Carrier regulations follow FMCSA guidelines.

These regulations, from which Uber declares itself exempt, apply to Uber even more considering Uber operates not only locally but as an Interstate Carrier. Just set your Uber app’s destination from Albuquerque to Denver or El Paso, and you will see for yourself.

The following section of Uber’s 2016 Transportation Network Services Act [TNSA] is in conflict with Federal law:

SECTION 3. NOT OTHER CARRIERS.–Transportation network companies and transportation network company drivers shall not be subject to the Motor Carrier Act or deemed[2] to provide any transportation service as defined in the Motor Carrier Act. A transportation network company driver shall not be required to register a personal vehicle as a commercial vehicle or vehicle for hire.[3]

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations; General

  • 390.5: Definitions. Driver means any person who operates any commercial motor vehicle. . . . For-hire motor carrier means a person engaged in the transportation of goods or passengers for compensation;

 As followed by the Missouri Class E License:

Individuals who may need to obtain a Class E license include:

  • Daycare employees.
  • Uber or Lyft drivers.
  • Limo drivers.
  • Taxi drivers.
http://www.dmv.org/mo-missouri/special-licenses.php#Class-E-Drivers-Licenses

Uber’s Predatory Pricing and Monopolistic Insurance Scheme

Uber’s proprietary app and insurance are essentially ‘non-compete’ conditions in their driver contract creating a Vertically Integrated Monopoly. There is no reasonable non-fleet commercial insurance available for other business models and Uber drivers aren’t insured if they stray from the Uber app.

The insurance scheme approved for the Transportation Network Services Act is not standard commercial insurance, but an electronically controlled scheme tied directly to the Uber app. Unless they have their own commercial insurance, Uber drivers have limited or no insurance under some circumstances while in Part A and B.

In addition, if an Uber driver takes a ‘personal’ call, they are operating with ZERO liability insurance. These are serious ‘gaps’ in Uber insurance and underwriters in some states are scrambling to create ‘gap insurance.’ But, that is not good enough.

Also in violation of Antitrust law is Uber’s past year of dropping their rates from $2.25 to 85 cents per mile. Not only is this incredibly exploitive of Uber drivers and cars, it is Predatory Pricing according to both state and federal Antitrust law.

Predatory Pricing is a foreign corporation using below cost prices with the intent[4] to take over a local market (predation), knowing that increasing prices without competition will recover their losses (recoupment).[5]

A pricing scheme secondary to Uber’s predation is their refusal to collect gross receipts taxes from fares collected through the app, or pay gross receipts on commissions paid out to drivers.[6] Uber evaded taxes from their inception, but legalized their tax fraud scheme in the vague language of the 2016 TNSA, Section 18:

SECTION 18. CONTROLLING AUTHORITY.–

  1. No municipality or other local entity may impose a tax on or require a license for a transportation network company, a transportation network company driver or a vehicle used by a transportation network company driver where a tax or license relates to providing prearranged rides or subjects a transportation network company to the municipality’s or other local entity’s rate, tax, license, entry, operational or other requirements, except for generally applicable business licenses or taxes.

This is unfortunate and unfair to legal taxi companies, and Call-A-Cab. The only way to correct this inequity is to preempt and or repeal the TNSA through the Supremacy Clause. 

Added: November 13, 2016–Desoto Cab Company of San Francisco agrees with my year of complaints against Uber’s Predatory Pricing and on November 2, 2016 filed Desoto vs. Uber in Federal Court. See Desoto Cab Co vs Uber Technologies

Summary of a Statutory Solution:

  1. Class E License — Uber drivers fall under the federal definition of ‘for hire’ and must apply for a Class E Chauffeur’s License. That would resolve the federal and state safety issues now ignored by Uber. Federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause would void Uber’s TNSA exemptions.
  2. With a Class E License and reasonable non-fleet (half the operational hours) ‘for hire’ commercial insurance, GPS ‘peer-to-peer’ logistics will be available to all citizens including hospitals, hotels, bars, restaurants, and anyone using just a landline.
  3. It is known nationwide that Uber’s commercial insurance has holes in coverage. Many states are scrambling to create ‘gap’ insurance.[7] Once the Class E license is law, the insurance companies must provide an appropriate commercial insurance policy (not a ‘gap’ patch) for ‘personal’ cars used for-hire. At about half the rate of fleet taxis leased ‘24/7,’ this insurance will be affordable as a fixed business cost for all but the most ‘part-time’ drivers.
  4. These solutions will permit both Uber and Taxi drivers to accept calls through Call-A-Cab’s GPS Logistics, or any other competing dispatch services for independent contract carriers.

I would appreciate your interest in my years of research and building Call-A-Cab. The next step, with your support and approval, is scheduling a presentation before the NMPRC.

 

[1] {30} Federal law may preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, by “express provision, by implication, or by a conflict between federal and state law.” New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995); Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 6, 124 N.M. 754, 955 P.2d 683. “The purpose of the preemption doctrine is to allow Congress to promulgate a uniform federal policy without states frustrating it through either legislation or judicial interpretation.” Largo v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 2002-NMCA-021, ¶ 6, 131 N.M. 621, 41 P.3d 347. Courts, however, apply a strong presumption against preemption, particularly in areas of law that are traditionally left to state regulation. Hennessy, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 8, 124 N.M. 754, 955 P.2d 683; Montoya v. Mentor Corp., 1996-NMCA-067, ¶ 7, 122 N.M. 2, 919 P.2d 410. {31} “Whether federal law preempts state law is generally a question of congressional intent.” Srader v. Verant, 1998-NMSC-025, ¶ 7, 125 N.M. 521, 964 P.2d 82. “`When Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included in the 921*921 legislation a provision expressly addressing the issue,’ we need only identify the domain expressly preempted by the federal statute and may infer that matters beyond that domain are not preempted.” Hennessy, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 6, 124 N.M. 754, 955 P.2d 683 (quoting Montoya, 1996-NMCA-067, ¶ 8, 122 N.M. 2, 919 P.2d 410).

[2] Deem, vb. 1. To treat (something) as if (1) it were really something else, or (2) it has qualities that it doesn’t have . . . Black’s Law Dictionary, Seventh Ed. 1999

[3] See also TNSA §§ 2, B. (2) and 2, C.

[4] Uber CEO Kalanick made it publicly known he was out to destroy ‘big taxi.’ http://recode.net/2014/05/28/travis-kalanick-uber-is-raising-more-money-to-fight-lyft-and-the-asshole-taxi-industry/

[5] Below-cost pricing intended to eliminate specific competitors and reduce overall competition is known as predatory pricing. Section 2 disallows this conduct. In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court devised a two-part test to determine if predatory pricing had occurred. First, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s production costs surpass the market price charged for the item. Second, the plaintiff must establish that a “dangerous probability” exists that the defendant will recover the investment in above-cost inputs. In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc. (05-381) (2007), the Supreme Court said that this test also applies when determining if a predatory bidding scheme exists.

[6] New Mexico Taxation and Revenue could find no gross receipts tax filings for Hinter-NM, LLC, Uber’s registered business name in New Mexico. See Connie L. Dayton, CPS, CFE, CFF, Forensic Tax Auditor, 505-841-6687 connie.dayton@state.nm.us

See  http://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-and-lyft-car-insurance.60340/

Legislative History of INA § 301(g) Proves Mark Levin WRONG About Ted Cruz

February 6, 2016

This article was published by World Net Daily. It is an important legal memorandum and simplifies the constitutional questions of how statute affects terms of art in the original text:

Opinion: Leonard A. Daneman on Ted Cruz Eligibility

http://www.wnd.com/2016/02/ted-cruzs-eligibility-tied-to-womens-rights-movement/

Legislative History of INA § 301(g)

The Citizenship of Ted Cruz Tied to Women’s Rights Movement

[Personal Note:   Why should I care? That is the $10 Trillion Question. If the Obama presidency had been blocked by the ‘birthers,’ perhaps our National Debt wouldn’t have doubled!

My response to Ms. Clemon’s comment summarizes the legal question: “So, the question is if the Harvard article or mine is in the public interest: Does the introduction of foreign nationality to a child who claims being a natural born citizen benefit the presidency viz Article II, or the singular citizenship of a child born of two U.S. citizens as it was from the beginning satisfy the intent of the framers?”

Here is another salient point: If the nationality of the father is inconsequential, then only the citizenship of the mother matters. After all, a child of a U.S. citizen father or alien father is eligible as long as the mother was a U.S. citizen!

How about Prof. Lawrence Tribe, who put so much weight on ‘native born’ that a child of two aliens, legal or illegal, is eligible to the presidency, just as long as they were born on U.S. soil.

Modern Americans have a ‘perception’ of Naturalization; not real knowledge. When you mention naturalization, they think of a courtroom with a U.S. flag and a line of new immigrants with their right hands raised giving the oath of allegiance.

Hopefully, after you read this article  (about 1700 words) on naturalization and repatriation of married women with children, you will understand that the framers would have never intended the child of an alien father eligible to the presidency; even if a so-called ‘citizen at birth.’ Alexander Hamilton proposed a version of Article II that specified a child ‘born a U.S. citizen,’ but John Jay insisted on a ‘natural born citizen,’ which cannot be created or changed by naturalization Law.

Ted Cruz’ citizenship through his mother was created by Naturalization Law. The 1952 statute separated him from Canadian citizenship upon moving to the U.S. at age four, and repatriated him through his mother. And so he is not eligible to run for the presidency.

Naturalization laws that gave Ted Cruz citizenship rights from birth were and still can be altered and changed, man-made. However, birth from two U.S. citizen parents is outside and independent of man-made law, and therefore a ‘natural’ born citizen.]

The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:

INA § 301 g. a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States.

Not all, but many legal professionals conclude that because Ted Cruz was a ‘citizen at birth,’ he is Article II eligible to the presidency.

However, at the time of the framers there were only four ways to become a citizen:

  1. You were a citizen of one of the states at the time of adoption of the  constitution
  2. You were born to a U.S. citizen father (more on the mother later)
  3. Your father naturalized while you were a minor child
  4. You naturalized after reaching the age of majority

Under both our First Uniform Naturalization Act of 1790 and the British Nationality Act of 1772, a child was the same foreign nationality as the father. Children were born with the father’s nationality through sanguinity, through blood, a legitimate and natural inheritance.

Now, consider this fact: That at the time of the framers and over 100-years of our history, Ted Cruz would have only become a citizen of the United States under #4 in the list above.

Based on both British and United States law, even if the mother was born a U.S. citizen, being married to a Canadian or British subject her child born in the United States would not be a U.S. citizen. And Ted Cruz was born in Canada.

So, I ask you the following:

  1. Would the framers and Article II as written and intended consider Ted Cruz a natural born citizen?
  2. Under 1930’s naturalization law, did repatriation to the United States of a mother with minor children, married to an alien father, revise Article II as written and intended? (See Intermediate Scrutiny Test)

The answer to both is ‘No.’

While naturalization law was once uncomplicated, the women’s rights movement unintentionally created a dichotomy in the legal doctrine of sanguinity, requiring an expansion of naturalization laws to deal with dual nationality at birth and repatriation.

What is Naturalization?

The Illinois Board of Elections decided that Ted Cruz was a natural born citizen. “The board distinguished between natural born and naturalized citizens, pointing out that Cruz did not have to take any steps to go through a naturalization process at some point after birth.”

By ‘process’ the board makes a common mistake, only seeing naturalization as that of an adult renouncing one citizenship (Ted Cruz renounced Canadian citizenship in 2014) and being permitted to take the Oath of Allegiance for U.S. citizenship. However, there is more to naturalization, as can be seen in the extensive body of law.

A minor’s nationality is affected by actions of parents; and which parent’s citizenship applies to the child comes under naturalization law. What happens when the child is born in another country, or to one alien parent? What happens when the child lives as one nationality, but before reaching the age of majority wishes to assume the other? This is also naturalization and includes numerous conditions and requirements as part of the legal ‘process.’

Minor vs Happersett (1875) declared, in a case involving a woman’s right to vote, it was ‘never doubted’ that the child of two U.S. citizen parents was a natural born citizen. And to this day it is still only that particular birth circumstance (even if born outside the U.S.) that produces a citizen naturally, without having to remove dual nationality of the minor with naturalization law.

The Evolution of Naturalization Law and Dual Nationality

The 14th Amendment is best-known for its ‘born in the United States’ and ‘equal protection’ clauses. However, it was written specifically for children born of freed black slaves. Because the father had no national allegiance or citizenship to confer to his children (See Dred Scott, and the 1866 Civil Rights Act) the legislature had to rely on, for the first time in U.S. naturalization law, birth on U.S. soil (jus soli).

The 19th and 20th century saw changes in the institution of marriage, racial inclusion, and legitimization of nullius fillius (children of unwed mothers) that required broader applications of sanguinity (inheritance by blood) if not a complete departure from it (1898). The application of ‘equal protection’ to sanguinity, until then only through the husband, created the previously unheard of concept of Dual Nationality.

Women’s Claims to Equal Citizenship Rights 1922-1940

Yale Law Journal Volume 123 Number 7, p. 2134-2573 ‘Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation,’ Kristin A. Collins

The reaction of some committee members to women’s claims to gender equality reveals a strong commitment to those traditional modes of regulating nationality. For example, in 1922, Richard Flournoy—then an assistant solicitor in the Department of State and later a member of the interdepartmental committee—found the idea that a married woman would maintain her American citizenship upon marriage to a foreigner “very objectionable” on the ground that it was “obviously a direct blow at the principle of family unity”—a reference to the principles of coverture[1] that resulted in women’s loss of independent civil identity upon marriage. In 1934 Congress passed a statute that gave American women the ability to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children with no explicit racial limitations.

A Woman’s Loss of U.S. Citizenship: Laws of Coverture

Prior to modern women’s rights, when a woman married a man she assumed a subordinate legal status to that of the husband. Before today’s no-contest divorce, communal property, and intestate succession laws, inheritance laws didn’t give a woman equal rights to property; they favored the husband’s side of the family.

In the same light, if marrying an alien she lost her U.S. citizenship. So, from the time of the framers and into the 1930’s, it was understood that only a U.S. citizen husband produced U.S. citizen children, natural born through sanguinity, father and mother together.

American women who married an alien would not only lose U.S. citizenship but produce alien children (1922):

  • 369. (a) A woman who has lost her United States citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien eligible to citizenship or by reason of the loss of United State citizenship by her husband may, if eligible to citizenship and if she has not acquired any other nationality by affirmative action, be naturalized upon full and complete compliance with all requirements of the naturalization laws, with the following exceptions: . . . (Repealed by act Oct. 14, 1940)

The 19th Amendment finally extended the vote to women in 1920. The 1922 Cable Act permitted repatriation to the United States if an American woman lost citizenship by marrying a foreigner. Her children would then gain U.S. citizenship with her. Other challenges were based on the ‘equal rights clause’ of the 14th Amendment, successfully comparing Coverture to slavery.

Over time, the legal doctrine of Coverture was finally eliminated. However, the retention of pre-marital U.S. citizenship created a bifurcated marriage, a dichotomy of nationalities requiring new naturalization laws to determine the child’s nationality and citizenship throughout the course of the marriage/dissolution, until the child reached the age of majority. In fact, Obama had three nationalities from birth to reaching adulthood.

However, to this day a ‘natural born citizen’ must be interpreted how the framers chose it to mean, and why; children of U.S. citizens without alienage had no possible foreign allegiance or affiliation. As specifically expressed by John Jay to George Washington, this was to avoid ‘foreign intrigue’ from the highest office of the land. Only a U.S. citizen ‘naturally born’ was immune from changes in naturalization law, natural law versus naturalization.

1933 Statute for Child Born Outside the United States Not a ‘Citizen at Birth’

Any child hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States whose father or mother or both at the time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United States, is declared to be a citizen of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to any such child unless the citizen father or citizen mother, as the case may be, has resided in the United Sates previous to the birth of such child. In cases where one of the parents is an alien, the right of citizenship shall not descend unless the child comes to the United States and reside therein for at least five years continuously immediately previous to his eighteenth birthday, and unless, within six months after the child’s twenty-first birthday, he or she shall take an oath of allegiance to the United States of America as prescribed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Labor. Am. June 10, 1933, Ex. Or. 6166, § 14; and May 24, 1934, c. 344, § 1. 48 Stat. 797. [emphasis added]

The term ‘citizenship at birth’ was not yet applied in the law.

Ted Cruz was Born December 22, 1970

Finally, the phrase ‘citizen at birth’ is used in the law.

The laws grew to accommodate women giving birth to children with dual nationality; specifically the 1940 statutes were repealed and replaced in 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) [INA § 301(a)(7)] as originally enacted by Act of June 27, 1952;

The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth:

[A] person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents, one of whom is a non-citizen, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totally not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years.

That law was liberalized and codified in 1986 as INA § 301(g); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g).

Through women’s rights and equality protection under the law, the concept of sanguinity was extended through the mother as it was, previously, only through the father; however dual nationality was a concept completely foreign to the framers and is, as you can see, the reason for the vast body of naturalization law necessary to remove any alienage created in a child at birth, or even temporary loss of citizenship due to unintentional expatriation of the mother. Only a natural born citizen, a child of two U.S. citizen parents, is immune from and undefined by naturalization law.

 

YouTube Boosts Call-A-Cab

September 7, 2015

Call-A-Cab gets great exposure on Google Search, but ‘new’ searches are way down which I attribute to Uber’s illegal penetration of the regular taxi user market. They just don’t have to ‘search’ anymore for ‘taxi.’

Those who use Call-A-Cab love it, for the fact they can use cash and don’t have to download an app . . . and it works very well, even easier to use than Uber.

Call-A-Cab on YouTube

Recent Court Decisions’ Unintentional Consequences, Making the Bible Unlawful Speech

April 17, 2014

Image

I am trained as a portrait and wedding photographer and this photo, 50 x 50 inches, hangs outside my small studio on a major thoroughfare. I also studied law in an ABA certified paralegal program.

In New Mexico, I had personal interaction with major players in the Gay Marriage laws, the author of the senate bill giving homosexuals special privileges in the Human Rights Act and the judge in the recent Elane vs. Willock wedding photography case. I was a student of the senator and read the original bill as drafted, and I sued the judge who wrote the majority opinion in Elane, twice.

I wrote a letter of protest to that senator, copied below. In it, I made two distinct conclusions of law and included a warning:

1) Same-sex couples cannot consummate and therefore ‘perfect’ marriage contract. Marriage law does not have provisions for same-sex partners, the law governing from ‘I do’ to ‘dissolution’ protects the spouse, children, and controls the distribution of property.

2) The above concludes that same-sex partners cannot contract under marriage law. Further proof is that any natural issue, children, from either partner, is per se ‘out-of-wedlock.’ Logic dictates, therefore, there was no wedlock, i.e., the ‘marriage’ is void ab initio.

However, the constitution guarantees the state cannot interfere in contract, and same-sex partners can contract to gain equal protections and rights. This is not a ‘separate but equal’ violation, because you cannot conflate Coitus with Sodomy.

Finally, if the Human Rights Act in New Mexico prevails, as does this horrible decision of the Court of Appeals forcing any wedding photographer into contract or face punitive fines, then the court through this horrible judge, a law-breaker and scoundrel, essentially makes the bible unlawful speech.

I see a possibility that a minister or civil servant will be prosecuted or fired if forced to solemnize a same-sex marriage, or issue marriage licenses; their refusal based on intimate belief in the bible, that homosexuality is the Sin of Sodom and not to be tolerated or associated with.

Nevertheless, will it come to the point when reading or citing scripture concerning homosexuality, the Sin of Sodom, is unlawful speech? I believe the United States has been protected by angels, but the Homosexual Agenda for Marriage and Roe vs. Wade Abortion have distanced our nation, the People, from Heavenly protection. For this reason, I make my case and publish it for those who have a heart to understand.

LETTER

to

State Senator Cisco McSorley

Dear Mr. McSorley,

I am a former student, Business Law at TVI, over ten years ago.

Gay Marriage laws are Lochnerean as they pit the police power of the state against existing contract law, history, and tradition. The state, to exert police power, must have a legitimate interest in the creation of same sex marital contract.

Yes, the state has considerable interest in marriage; the point proven when one reviews the considerable body of law that has grown out of ‘I do,’ ‘I now pronounce,’ all the way to Divorce, Probate, and Intestate Succession. You see, Marriage not only is formation of a special partnership but extends to its dissolution requiring consideration of children, who are not directly privy to the original contract, or oath, except through bloodline.

The state high courts invoked the 14th Amendment (NM Const Art 2 § 18), but they misapplied ‘equal protection’ which in that clause specifies the sexes, male and female, not various forms of ‘sexuality,’ even if Homosexuals have recently become a ‘protected class.’ This was false logic; a weak if not impossible conflation of terms, or at worse an unconstitutional revision.

In addition, Justice Holmes’ famous ‘history and tradition’ must be considered, and the bible is an indelible foundation to our tenets, morals and body of law, if not vital precedent. In this case, the court has revised law and contract that effectively makes the bible itself unlawful.

Natural Law must not be violated; indeed, the courts have no jurisdiction over Natural Law. Therefore, God of the bible as the source/creator of all Natural Law, ‘nature’s law,’ is that ‘light’ that reveals the truth and creates both shadows and penumbras; not a careless misinterpretation of law by human judges.[1]

The state is now exercising its power in defiance of history, tradition, and may I add nature. Poor Elane and her husband can never again freely engage in her ‘liberty to contract’ wedding photography and is forced to either accept gay marriage or pay the fine (Cf. Islamic ‘jizyah’).

The state (Judge Tim Garcia in the NM Court of Appeals) unconstitutionally interfered with her right of contract (wedding photography is not a ‘service’ per se). Therefore, the state has chosen an illogical conflation of rights and protections in defiance of Natural Law, History, Tradition, and Liberty of Contract, while declaring the bible unlawful in the process.

Same Sex Marriage Void Ab Initio

The act of consummation, coitus, is an essential element of the marriage contract (with rare medical exemptions if known by the parties), for without issue, a bloodline, the bulk of the law is irrelevant and the contract imperfect, a sham, void ab initio.

In a same sex ‘marriage,’ any natural issue from either member of a same sex partnership is automatically ‘out of wedlock,’ and therefore logic prevails in the conclusion that no wedlock existed, or could exist in the first place.

Tim Garcia

Tim Garcia and I go way back, to 1998, when I introduced him to the original owners of TowerPlaza. As thanks, Tim forced me out of my photography studio, but I was able to rebuild on the 5th Floor under a new 5-year lease. Tim hired an incompetent elevator maintenance company who miswired the door actuator, frying the relays. My new wedding and portrait photography studio was closed, only five months after completing extensive renovations. I had only shot one wedding.

I fought Garcia in small claims court and won, but my attorney refused to submit his legal fees, over $2000, which exceeded any savings in abated rent. I petitioned Judge Roderick T. Kennedy to remove my attorney of record so I could submit the motion for attorney fees and injunctive relief, but he refused time and time again until his jurisdiction expired.

When Tim Garcia refused to fix the elevator, interpreting Kennedy’s judgment in my favor as an order I operate in an out of code and illegal condition for the contracted term of the lease, I sued in Federal court pro se under ADA Title III and Continuing Nuisance as a New Cause of Action.

The judge denied my jury trial, dismissing the case. However, Tim Garcia was fired from his LLC manager position, was forced to sell his membership, and had to close his law offices in Santa Fe.

[1] Read the original Wall of Separation sermon by Roger Williams, and despite Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptists and J. Hugo Black creating the Separation of Church and State, there is no ‘wall,’ but the bible itself protecting a just society from lawlessness.

Facebook Post on Gay Marriage Laws

February 17, 2014

https://www.facebook.com/leonard.daneman/posts/239001269618617?notif_t=like